The focus of this research concentrated on ascertaining the presence of ethical climate types and the level of analysis from which ethical decisions were based as perceived by lodging managers. In agreement with Victor and Cullen (1987, 1988), ethical work climates are multidimensional and multi-determined. The results of this study indicated that: (a) benevolence is the predominate dimension of ethical climate present in the lodging organization as perceived by lodging managers, and (b) the local level of analysis (e.g. immediate workplace (...) norms and values) is the predominate determinant of ethical decisions in the organization.The implication of this study is that the knowledge gained from understanding that ethical decision making in an organization is multidimensional and multi-determined will foster understanding of ethical decision formation in the organizational context. (shrink)

In Sartre’s 1946 article “The Humanism of Existentialism,” Sartre places existentialists into two categories, Christian or atheist, and contends that existentialism works differently for each of them. This paper argues that such a distinction should not have been made because existentialist beliefs, views, and themes do not differ based on one’s religiosity. This paper specifically examines three examples in Sartre’s article which undermine his position, and further argues that Sartre made an equivocation fallacy by conflating two different types of essence, (...) one’s innate essence and one’s character essence. The paper then explores six central existentialist themes to demonstrate that in their existentialist beliefs both the theist and the atheist agree. Those six themes are authenticity, sincerity vs. bad faith, the absurdity of life, the meaning of life, choice, and responsibility. The paper also examines the issue of moral objectivity vs. non-objectivity, and argues that not only is this not an existentialist issue, but even if it were one’s belief on moral objectivity does not cleanly correspond to one’s religious beliefs, so here again there is no basis to distinguish the Christian and the atheist. The paper concludes that any disagreement between existentialists who are Christian and those who are atheist comes down to differences in their religious beliefs, not their existentialist views. (shrink)

It has been demonstrated by a host of Analytic philosophers that language imprecision and equivocation have been sources of confusion on many philosophical issues. This paper explores five such issues, and attempts to not only scrutinize the confusion, but further to show that once this is done, we can make progress on the issues themselves. First, the word “think” has various definitions which lead to diverse conclusions on whether computers or AI can or will think, and whether we do or (...) will have duties to computers or AI. Second, Hume’s misunderstanding of “identity” when referring to “personal identity” caused him to mistakenly conclude that the self or personal identity was a fiction. Third, there are dueling and incompatible definitions of free will offered by the libertarian and the compatibilist which unnecessarily muddy the waters on the issue of whether we have free will or not. Fourth, Paley’s comparison of the order displayed by a watch and the order displayed in the universe failed to notice that a substantially different type of order is found in each one, and that the type of order found in the universe can be explained naturalistically and need not rely on an appeal to a maker (or a metaphysical creator such as God) unlike a watch which does need and have a creator or maker. Last, Sartre’s differentiation of Christian and atheistic existentialists was based on a failure to notice that when he referred to human “essence” he was conflating two very different types of essence, specifically, innate essence and character essence. Sartre’s equivocation error led him to mistakenly conclude that the religious person and the atheist have different views on existentialist issues. (shrink)

This paper proposes that we rename free will, also called libertarian free will, to the more accurate characterization of “predisposed agency.” This is needed for two reasons: First, classical compatibilists have redefined free will to mean something quite different than and in fact contrary to libertarian free will, and thus have introduced needless confusion into the concept. More importantly, even those who believe in libertarian free will recognize that our will is not so free in that we are predisposed toward (...) the decisions we make and the actions we take due to our genetics and our environment, which include our temperament, our character, our past experiences, our past decisions, our habits, the people we have been with, and the situations we find ourselves in, among other things. But the term “free will” totally ignores the fact that we are predisposed toward certain actions. The danger in this is that if we use the lexicon of free will, and believe in free will, then we are apt to judge others harshly for their actions since if they have free will then it would seem they bear both full responsibility and blame for their actions. But this seems unfair since each of us is predisposed to think, decide, and act as we do. The author proposes a distinction between having responsibility and deserving blame and praise. Specifically, it is argued that if we do have agency (or libertarian free will) then we are fully responsible for what we do, but due to our predispositions, which we necessarily and unavoidably have and are often largely out of our control, we frequently do not deserve full blame or praise. (shrink)

"In The Givenness of Desire, Randall S. Rosenberg examines the human desire for God through the lens of Lonergan's "concrete subjectivity." Rosenberg engages and integrates two major scholarly developments: the tension between Neo-Thomists and scholars of Henri de Lubac over our natural desire to see God and the theological appropriation of the mimetic theory of René Girard, with an emphasis on the saints as models of desire. With Lonergan as an integrating thread, the author engages a variety of thinkers, (...) including Hans Urs von Balthasar, Jean-Luc Marion, René Girard, James Alison, Lawrence Feingold, John Milbank, among others. The theme of concrete subjectivity helps to resist the tendency of equating too easily the natural desire for being with the natural desire for God without at the same time acknowledging the widespread distortion of desire found in the consumer culture that infects contemporary life. The Givenness of Desire investigates our paradoxical desire for God that is rooted in both the natural and supernatural."--. (shrink)

This essay argues that William Cavanaugh's ‘Theopolitical Imagination’ uncovers some of the possibilities latent within the Catholic imagination. While his critique of modernity is often persuasive, this essay questions whether Cavanaugh's assessment of modernity can be complemented by a more differentiated approach. What Charles Taylor provides is both a bolstering of Cavanaugh's thesis about the power of the imagination and an alternative: that there is a way of thinking about the relationship between the Church and modernity other than in dialectical (...) terms – namely a ‘Ricci reading’ of modernity. (shrink)

: Educational historians, philosophers, and sociologists have long warned that the increasing encroachment of business logic in public schools bodes ill for democracy as a way of life. Many have concluded that the business person's interest in affecting public education is to bring about a greater bottom line, which, of course, is profit, albeit secured in the name of democratic freedom and social progress. These scholars have noted that the corporate parasite is eating away the insides of our public schools (...) and is reproducing its hereditary material (consumer materialism) within the bodies and souls of its captive hosts: our children. Through corporate advertisements on school walls, corporate-sponsored curriculum materials and programs, and corporate-sponsored fundraisers and contests (not to mention the enormous political influence corporations have in framing the very aim and purpose of public education), corporations use schools as conduits by which to establish consumption as the ultimate expression of participatory democracy and, thus, as the supreme good and standard of personal growth. Drawing upon the work of John Dewey, this paper articulates a conception of democracy and a democratic theory of education that privileges the social over the private, the public over the corporate, such that the homo-economicus ideal that our public schools train our children to aspire to on a daily basis is checked by a wider commitment to the good life, defined in more socially benevolent ways. (shrink)

Many researchers in the field of business ethics have attempted to develop methods to determine and evaluate the ethics of a variety of different classes of people, including students, professionals, and mixed samples of students and professionals. Unfortunately, most of these studies were disjunctive, simply adding confusion to an already unfocused area of research. However, Reidenbach and Robin (1988, 1990), have changed this trend by attempting to quantify the various ethical philosophies into a multi-dimensional scale of business ethics. This paper (...) examines the background of the Reidenbach and Robin (1988, 1990) scale — including the authors'' findings, empirically tests the scale, and concludes that the scale needs further refinement. A promising result is a model with four dimensions: a broadbased ethical judgment dimension, a deontological judgment dimension, a teleological judgment dimension, and a social contract dimension. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to build upon previous ethical research; thereby, advancing the hospitality industry's understanding of ethical decision making in lodging operations. In particular, this study reviewed: (a) the primary normative ethical precepts (i.e., egoism, benevolence, and principle) used as a criterion in ethical decision making, and (b) the predominant locus of analysis (e.g., individual, local, or cosmopolitan referent sources) used in applying ethical precepts to ethical decisions.The sample consisted of 500 lodging operations as randomly abstracted from (...) the 1994 Hotel Travel Index produced by Reed Travel. The researcher selected full service, limited service, or as rooms-only lodging operations throughout the United States. A full service property offered guest rooms, meeting rooms, and food and beverage services. A limited service property offered a continental breakfast, small meeting facilities, and guest sleeping rooms. A rooms-only property only offered guest rooms. This purposive sampling process resulted in 198 usable surveys. (shrink)

Interdisciplinarity is a notoriously difficult concept to define, and even harder to achieve in practice. All too often social approaches reduce science to an object of study, or conversely physical science approaches are invoked as a source of 'higher' truth. Drawing upon our experiences as ESRC-NERC PhD students within geography, we outline a paratactical approach that links disciplines by adjacency rather than hierarchy. Toppling the disciplinary hierarchy creates the potential for non-reductionistic dialogue between science and social science, but it also (...) raises a series of practical difficulties. These are considered around the themes of polyvocality, breadth over depth and (im)permanence. We suggest that while this kind of approach is increasingly encouraged by research funding bodies, it is less easily sustained within the everyday mechanics of the academic world. (C) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Conflict produces group solidarity in four phases: (1) an initial few days of shock and idiosyncratic individual reactions to attack; (2) one to two weeks of establishing standardized displays of solidarity symbols; (3) two to three months of high solidarity plateau; and (4) gradual decline toward normalcy in six to nine months. Solidarity is not uniform but is clustered in local groups supporting each other's symbolic behavior. Actual solidarity behaviors are performed by minorities of the population, while vague verbal claims (...) to performance are made by large majorities. Commemorative rituals intermittently revive high emotional peaks; participants become ranked according to their closeness to a center of ritual attention. Events, places, and organizations claim importance by associating themselves with national solidarity rituals and especially by surrounding themselves with pragmatically ineffective security ritual. Conflicts arise over access to centers of ritual attention; clashes occur between pragmatists deritualizing security and security zealots attempting to keep up the level of emotional intensity. The solidarity plateau is also a hysteria zone; as a center of emotional attention, it attracts ancillary attacks unrelated to the original terrorists as well as alarms and hoaxes. In particular historical circumstances, it becomes a period of atrocities. (shrink)

The discussion of logic at Harvard enjoyed a golden era, beginning with Peirce's 1898 lectures and culminating in the work of Whitehead's students, especially Susanne Langer and W. V. O. Quine. Peirce's lectures sparked an exchange with Josiah Royce that led Royce beyond his tinkering with classical forms and into a more mathematized approach. Reading in the recent literature in the philosophy of mathematics, Royce encountered Whitehead's work. The development of System Sigma, Royce's mature formal logic, was an extension of (...) Whitehead's earlier work. In the time between Royce's death (1916) and Whitehead's arrival at Harvard (1924), the accomplishments of Royce were taken up by some of Royce's students (especially C. I. Lewis and Henry Sheffer), who were critical of various aspects of Royce and developed their own approaches. These logicians were among Whitehead's daily conversation partners. That Whitehead knew of Royce's work, secondhand, seems assured, but whether he ever read or got an unmediated account of System Sigma we don't know. Nevertheless, by tracing the conversation through Lewis and Sheffer, up to Langer and Quine, we get a picture of the context of discussion in logic at Harvard during Whitehead's tenure there that shows a surprisingly rich connection to Royce's mature work. That narrative is offered in this article. (shrink)

When a patient lacks capacity, medical decisions on their behalf are made according to an advance directive or by surrogate decision making. Often, however, patients’ previously expressed wishes are ambiguous, vague, inconsistent, or fail to anticipate the patient’s current condition. In this paper, we argue that when patient’s wishes are not clear, surrogates must utilize interpretative principles to reach a decision regarding treatment. We identify three such principles: the value-substitution, value-coherence, and volitional principles. We argue that the volitional principle is (...) the most reliable way of capturing what the patient would have wanted when they no longer possess decisional capacity. This approach tasks the surrogate with identifying a medical choice close to what the patient would have agreed to based on previously expressed wishes without attributing the surrogate’s own values to the patient or attempting to provide an interpretation consistent with the patient’s other values. This approach is best positioned to support patients’ sovereignty for those who were previously able to express wishes for or against life-sustaining treatment. (shrink)

Functionalism has been increasingly challenged by legal comparatists questioning its nature and suitability. These epistemologically-focused critiques have effectively dichotomised modern comparative law methods, leaving two undertheorised possibilities, namely, the functionalist model—understood in conventional positivist (and substance-ontic) lexes—and emergent postmodern approaches as typified by Pierre Legrand’s system of ‘negative comparative law’ protocols. This article explores an often-neglected alternative grounded in process-relational philosophy. As shown by re-examining Ernst Rabel’s original model, its central claim is that a synthesis of early functionalist theory and (...) process-relational principles exposes postmodern critiques as imprecise and overstated—arguably misconceiving key notions of ‘difference’ and ‘similarity’, and consequently failing to appreciate how greater awareness of the correct order and relationships between levels of abstraction can enhance the nature and possibilities of comparative legal knowledge. (shrink)

Josiah Royce (1855–1916) war weniger als sechs Jahre älter als Alfred North Whitehead, aber wie C. S. Peirce scheint auch Royce aus einer früheren Zeit zu stammen. Der Grund dafür ist, dass Royce ein junges Wunderkind war, das noch vor seinem 30. Lebensjahr berühmt wurde und nicht lange lebte (61 Jahre), während Whiteheads Karriere als Vollzeit-Philosoph erst nach dem Tod von Royce (und Peirce) begann und über drei Jahrzehnte nach Royces Tod fortdauerte. Wir betrachten Whitehead als einen repräsentativen Philosophen der (...) ersten Hälfte des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, während Royce in das Zeitalter des Fin de Siècle gehört. Es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, dass die beiden Denker sich nie begegnet sind. Aber Royce kannte Whiteheads mathematische Arbeiten, verfolgte sie und entwickelte sie sogar in wichtigen Punkten weiter. Whitehead könnte davon gewusst haben, denn die Kommentare zu Treatise on Universal Algebra (1913), die Royce veröffentlicht hat, könnten Whitehead erreicht haben, da der Aufsatz wurde von Theodor de Laguna im Journal of Philosophy rezensiert wurde. Whitehead könnte also von dem Artikel erfahren haben, erstens, weil DeLaguna ihn rezensiert hat, und zum Teil auch wegen des Ortes, an dem er veröffentlicht wurde, und zweitens, weil Royce in dem Artikel Russells Principles of Mathematics kritisiert, was Russell sicherlich auffiel, als er und Whitehead ihre Zusammenarbeit begannen, und drittens, weil der Aufsatz in einer Zeitschrift veröffentlicht wurde, die alle Mathematiker lasen. Wir können mit einiger Sicherheit sagen, dass Whitehead von Royces Arbeit in Mathematik und Logik wusste. (shrink)

In this provocative book, Randall Havas articulates an approach to Nietzsche which demonstrates that the authentic individual need not stand apart from his or her culture in order to resist the demands of conformism. On Havas's reading, the task of the Nietzschean individual is instead to replace the illusion of culture - "herd morality" - with real community, and in this way to avoid nihilism. It is such community that Nietzsche aspires to establish with his readers - a claim (...) that, in the author's view, suggests that Nietzsche's conception of the nature of community and, hence, of individuality must be understood in terms of his theory of reading and interpretation. Nietzsche holds that the category of the individual is itself a historical construct. Havas's interpretation of this view dissolves the threat it appears to pose to individualism. By treating genealogical method as a response to this threat, he shows how Nietzsche's defense of individualism, his conception of history, and his commitment to truth reinforce one another. On this reading, Nietzsche's more properly ethical concerns lie at the heart of his understanding of the will to knowledge. Havas argues that, for Nietzsche, ostensibly epistemological questions can be assessed only in the light of an understanding of the interdependence between individual and community. (shrink)

Aristotle regarded law and education as the two fundamental and deeply interdependent tools of political art, making the use of education by the statesman a topic of the first importance in his practical philosophy. The present work develops the first comprehensive treatment of this neglected topic, and assesses the importance of Aristotle's defense of public education for current debates about school choice and privatization, and educational equality.

cis is presented of Randall Collins's book, The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change. It presents a sociological theory of intellectual networks that connect thinkers in chains of masters and pupils, colleagues and rivals, and of the internalized conversations that constitute the social processes of thinking. The theory is used to analyze long-term developments of the intellectual communities of philosophers in ancient Greece, ancient and medieval China and India, medieval and modern Japan, medieval Islam and Judaism, (...) medieval Christendom, and modern Europe through the early 20th century. (shrink)